
Two aspects of Spain’s democracy have always struck me as being contrary to the very principles of democratic governance: its questionable separation of powers and lack of political accountability.
The first of these is the lack of a clear separation of powers, especially between the executive and legislative branches of government, but also with respect to the powers delegated to the judicial branch. Perhaps this is in part due to the fact that Spain is a constitutional monarchy wherein the King is the ultimate head of state. Nevertheless, the basic functions of the executive branch, as assumed by the president and his ministries, are in practice inseparable from the majority rule of the legislature.
In other words, the president and the congressional majority are one and the same. Much of this is due to Spain’s system of electing its president and congressional representatives. Instead of voting to elect individual representatives for specific congressional seats, there is a single “presidential” election, and each party presents one presidential candidate plus a fixed, closed list of potential congressional representatives (for both the senate and the lower legislative chamber). Based on the pro-rata share of the votes, the congressional seats are allocated accordingly between each party, and the party with the majority of votes wins the presidency.
When the president takes office and assumes power, his cabinet members and ministers generally serve in the legislature as well. For example, Carme Chacón is both the Minister of Defense and a representative in congress. This same lack of a Chinese wall standing between the executive and legislative branches is also replicated at the regional level (i.e., Esperanza Aguirre, the president of the Madrid autonomous region is also a representative in Madrid’s legislature).
The immediate result is that the voice of the presidency and the legislature’s majority is one and the same, united and indivisible. Any disputes that could possibly arise within the ruling party are always settled in private; thus leading to a total lack of transparency or public inter-party debate. This inevitably leads to the alienation of local interests at the national level. There are two principle reasons for this: public differences on policies are strictly prohibited by the party, even though it is only logical that constituents from different regions will likely have differing political interests on any given matter (what’s good for one locality may not be good for another), and, as I will explain further below, the representatives are accountable to their party alone and not to their supposed constituents. Continue reading →